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CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

Since that time, in the entire United States only one case, decided in
Wyoming in 1947, has been concerned with motives and ends as distinct
from truth and from malice.' 8 The fact that the question arises so infrequently suggests that the requirement of proper motives and ends is
becoming a purely formal one and that in those states where it exists the
courts will go a long way to protect statements which they believe to be true.
The requirement that motives and ends, as well as truth, are required
to make out a defense to civil libel, has had some effect on the formalities of
pleading the truth, but apparently none on the results. An analysis of
Illinois cases since Ogren uncovers none which permitted recovery against
a defendant who told the exact truth and could prove it; and none to a
newspaper defendant that could prove that it told the essential truth and
acted without malice. So far as can be determined, there has never been a
case-except Ogren-which went beyond requiring the absence of malice to
demand a showing of some kind of positive good motives.
What motives would be "good," what ends would be "justifiable," are
unanswered questions. The answers may ultimately be those suggested in
the LaMonte case-to want the truth to be known is in itself a good
motive; to speak so that the truth may be known is in itself a justifiable end.
This approach was used many years ago by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court 19 in a decision quoted with approval last year by the United States
20
Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisiana:
It has been said it is lawful to publish truth from good motives,
and for justifiable ends. But this rule is too narrow. If there is a
lawful occasion-a legal right to make a publication-and the
matter true,
the end is justifiable and that, in such case, must be
21
sufficient.
MRs. B. SIDLER

DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
In Illinois and in other states as well, citizens and newspapers who have
criticized public officials and candidates for public office have had to pay
both damages for civil defamation and fines for criminal libel. If they were
unable to prove the truth of their charges, and in Illinois if they were
unable to prove good motives and justifiable ends as well, their speech was
not protected. The free exchange of views and information on matters of
public concern which the First Amendment was enacted to protect could
be and often was severely inhibited by the sanctions of a civil suit or a
criminal prosecution.
18 Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947).
19 State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 31 Am. Dec. 217 (1837).
20 379 U.S. 64, 85 Sup. Ct. 209 (1964).
21 Id. at 73, 85 Sup. Ct. at 215.

LIBEL AND SLANDER IN ILLINOIS

The conflict between the rights of free speech and freedom of the press
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the right
to be secure from injury to reputation resulting from the publication of
defamatory material is particularly acute in the field of political controversy,
in which statements are likely to be made in the heat of campaign battle,
with passion, and often without too much care for the exact truth. However,
such statements, false and even malicious though they may be, often do deal
with issues about which the public has a right to be informed.
The traditional Illinois position with respect to the conflict between
free speech and the right to be protected from defamatory statements was
simply to define the area of protected free speech in such a way as to exclude
defamatory statements. For example, in Cook v. East Shore Newspapers,l
the court said:
While the right of free speech and free press is recognized, which
includes the right to publish matters in the interest of the public
and to criticize and condemn
public officials, it does not include
2
the right to libel them.
There are four possible types of statements one might make about a
public official and be subject to an action for defamation. They are: (1)
statements which are false and made with (actual) malice; (2) statements
which are false and made without (actual) malice; (3) statements which are
true but made with malice (or without proper motives and justifiable ends);
and (4) statements which are true and made without malice (or for proper
motives). In addition, a statement may be "comment"-fair or unfair-reflecting opinion or viewpoint but having no verifiable factual content
(neither true nor false).
Theoretically, any statement of the first three types, if it would tend to
degrade the memory of the dead, or to impeach the reputation or expose
the natural defects of one who is alive, thereby subjecting him to public
contempt or financial injury, would be actionable. 3 As a matter of fact,
almost all cases in which a public official plaintiff has recovered have been
of the first type. 4 Although there is rarely a finding that the statement in
question was false, the defendant was unable to prove that it was true, and
the presumption that a defamatory statement is false went unrebutted.
The Illinois attitude toward libelous statements about public officials
has from the beginning been one of protection of the plaintiff politician at
the expense of the freedom of expression of the defendant newspaper and
at the expense of the right of the public to be fully informed. False state1 327 Il1. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (4th Dist. 1946).
Id. at 596, 64 N.E.2d at 767.
3 I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 402 (1874).
4 Some may be in the second group; the presence or absence of actual malice is often
difficult to determine.
2
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ments, or statements which the defendant could not prove to be true, were
actionable, and the necessary "malice" was presumed.
Although this symposium is not specifically concerned with criminal
defamation, it is interesting to note that in Illinois a criminal libel prosecution for criticism of public officials is far from unheard-of. There is a long
series of Illinois cases, usually involving state's attorneys, sheriffs, or other
law enforcement officials, whose conduct in office was criticized by newspapers and who secured convictions for criminal libel.
One such case, People v. Fuller,5 has frequently been cited as authority
in civil libel cases for the proposition that false defamatory statements
about public officials are not protected by privilege and that the burden
of proving their truth rests with the defendant. In Fuller, the complainant
was a county treasurer, and the local newspaper accused him of filching
county funds. In upholding a $200 fine, the Illinois Supreme Court said that
although the public conduct of all public officers is a matter of public concern and may be made the subject of fair and reasonable criticism, the
privilege does not extend to false and defamatory statements imputing a
criminal offense or moral delinquency to the officer in discharge of his
official duties. 6 The court analyzed the public record of the expenditures in
question and found as a matter of law that they were proper and that therefore the defendant's statements were false. In addition, it found evidence in
the record that the defendant's motives were malicious.
A very similar case, People v. Stroud,7 involved allegations that a state's
attorney played poker until 3 a.m., drank whiskey with a beer chaser, and
engaged in other improper conduct. A fine of $300 was upheld.
The most recent such case in Illinois was People v. Doss8 in which a
judgment finding the defendant guilty of criminal libel was affirmed. The
defamatory statements concerned a state's attorney and were to the effect
that he was not an impartial prosecutor and was "a lying and deceitful man."
The use of criminal libel by public officials to inhibit criticism of their
conduct received a severe setback from the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Garrison v. Louisiana.9 In that case the defendant, district attorney of Orleans Parish, criticized the eight judges of the Criminal District
Court of the Parish, accusing them of being inefficient, lazy, and taking
excessive vacations, thus causing a large backlog of untried cases to accumulate. In addition, he statqd that they refused to authorize disbursements to cover the expenses of his undercover agents, thereby hampering his
-efforts to enforce the vice laws. He further indicated that their performance
5 238 Il1. 116, 87 N.E. 336 (1909).

6 Id. at 125, 87 N.E. at 338.
7 247 I11. 220, 93 N.E. 126 (1910).

8 384 I1. 400, 51 N.E.2d 517 (1944), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 789, 64 Sup. Ct. 788 (1944).
9 379 U.S. 64, 85 Sup. Ct. 209 (1964).
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and attitude raised interesting questions about racketeer influences on
the judges.
In reversing the conviction for criminal libel, the Supreme Court held
that it was an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights to
impose criminal sanctions on criticism of public officials unless the statement is false and made either with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether it was true or false. 10 Under no circumstances, according to Garrison, can a true statement about a public official be the subject
of an action for criminal libel.
It is of course perfectly possible for an officeholder or group in office to
attempt to use a civil libel action as a means of inhibiting criticism. The
imposition of substantial damages can be just as effective a deterrent to
free expression as the exaction of a fine."
Bearing in mind the inhibiting effects of a policy which protects the
public official by requiring that statements concerning his conduct be
provably true and made without malice, let us look at some of the more
important Illinois cases in which newspapers have attacked public officials
and lost.
The leading Illinois case on libel by newspaper-Ogren v. Rockford
Star Printing Co.12-was discussed in the preceding section on Motives and
Ends. However, in addition to being the first case to adopt the restrictive
interpretation of the "truth plus motives" provision of the 1870 Illinois
Constitution, the Ogren case also held that:
To a malicious publication against a candidate for public office
and it is not a defense
there is no defense on the ground of privilege,
3
that it is honestly and mistakenly made.'
Obviously, if a statement is "honestly and mistakenly made," the malice to
which the court referred is malice implied in law, not actual malice.
In Cook v. East Shore Newspapers,'4 the plaintiff was an East St. Louis
judge. The defendant newspapers published a story to the effect that, in the
plaintiff's court, the court reporter had been forced to pay a kickback to the
judge to secure her job. The trial court found that the defendant had been
unable to prove the charges true and that they were in fact not true. In
affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the appellate court said:
It is the law in Illinois that a publication by a newspaper of a
statement of fact, which is not true, against an individual and
which is libelous per se, is actionable and not privileged. 15
10 This is the New York Times test. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80, 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 726 (1964).
11 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67, 85 Sup. Ct. 209, 215 (1964).
12 288 I1. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).
13 Id. at 417, 123 N.E. at 592.
14 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (4th Dist. 1946).
15 Id. at 578, 64 N.E.2d at 760.
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In its opinion, the court specifically disapproved the doctrine of Coleman
v. MacLennon,16 which is the leading case for what, at the time, was the
minority view-"that the right of fair comment on matters of public interest
17
extends, in the absence of malice, to misstatements of fact.'
The Cook case relied on a long line of prior Illinois cases involving
politicians and newspapers, including some of the criminal libel cases
discussed above, to the effect that qualifiedly privileged statements "lose
their character as such on proof of actual malice."' 8 However, no actual
malice was proven in this case; the existence of malice must have been
assumed from the nature of the material published because there was no
extrinsic evidence of malice.
Belt v. Tribune Co.' 9 is another example of the lack of protection
which Illinois courts extend to political reporting. In this case the plaintiff,
a civil engineer, charged the Tribune with publishing an article which contained allegedly false and malicious statements to the effect that Army
engineers, on the advice of the plaintiff, had destroyed a sewage system, an
underground water supply system, and a mile of roadway, and that the
plaintiff's firm was collecting a percentage of the cost of replacing the
facilities. The appellate court found that the complaint stated a cause of
action for libel and dismissed the "fair comment" defense on the ground
that "fair comment was not justified in view of the denial of the truth of
the comment; and fair comment and criticism cannot be predicated upon
unfair or false statements of facts." 20
The most recent Illinois case along these lines was Van Norman v.
Peoria Journal-Star,21 decided in 1961. In that case, the defendant newspaper published a story that had been reported to it by the incumbent
mayor of Peoria. The part of the report that was the basis of the complaint
read as follows:
Morgan [mayor of Peoria] also characterized Van Norman as a
man who came to City Hall in a drunken condition carrying a
gun that
had to be taken away from him before he hurt some22
body.
The defendant claimed that it had published a true report of the
remarks of Mayor Morgan, and that such matters were fair comment and
criticism and privileged, having arisen out of an incident which occurred
on February 7, 1951 wherein plaintiff pointed a gun at Z. 0. Monroe in the
city hall lobby and threatened to take his life.
The evidence was conflicting as to just what happened on the occasion
16

78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).

17 Id. at 726, 98 Pac. at 290.
18 327 Ill.
App. 559, 578; 64 N.E.2d 751, 760 (4th Dist. 1946).
19 6 I11.
App. 2d 489, 128 N.E.2d 638 (1st Dist. 1955).
20
21
22

Id. at 494, 128 N.E.2d at 640.
31 Il.'App. 2d 314, 175 N.E.2d 805 (2d Dist. 1961).
Id. at 320, 175 N.E.2d at 807.
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to which the mayor referred. There was some question about the accuracy
of the date, and it appeared that whatever it was that happened, the plaintiff was not drunk. In other words, the story was inaccurate.
The defendant newspaper argued that the imposition of punitive
damages in this case would impede rather than promote the public welfare
and could not help but have an inhibiting and stultifying effect upon the
rigorous exercise of the freedom of the press. It argued further that if a
newspaper may report a campaign of this nature only at the peril of having
a jury assess substantial penalties upon the publisher, then the people will
not obtain information of a controversial nature, but only pious platitudes.
In making this argument, the defendant anticipated the position of
the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan,23 but it was unsuccessful, and a verdict of $20,000, including $15,000 punitive damages,
was upheld.
One final illustration may be given of the traditional Illinois view of
these cases. In the case of Proesel v. Myers Pub. Co.,24 the defendant newspaper had published a story accusing the plaintiff, mayor of Lincolnwood,
of misusing village funds by diverting money from the waterworks program
to reroute a sewer. The newspaper quoted another defendant as the source
of the story, a village trustee named Ream.
The defendant moved to strike the complaint for failing to state a
cause of action. The trial court granted the motion to strike but was reversed on appeal. The appellate court held that the effect of the defendant's
motion to strike was to admit for purposes of the pleadings that the libelous
statements were false. If they were false, said the court, then the defense of
fair comment or criticism would not be available to the defendant. The
court characterized the statements as libelous per se, not because they charged
the plaintiff with a crime, but because they charged him with incapacity in
office. The court quoted with approval from Ogren: "An intention to serve
the public good cannot authorize or justify a defamation of private character." 25 The court did not explain how misuse of the waterworks funds could
be considered a private act.
Following the trial, a second appeal by the newspaper resulted in a
sharp reversal of position. Although the reversal was technically on the
basis of the "innocent construction rule," the court expressed its awareness
of the intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision in New York Times in the
following words:
If... there were left any room for argument, the memorable decision of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan would have effectively disposed of this case beyond dispute. It was there held on constitutional grounds that the publica23

376 U.S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).

24

24 111. App. 2d 501, 165 N.E.2d 352 (lst Dist. 1960).

25

288 111. 405, 417, 123 N.E. 587, 592 (1919).
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tion of false and defamatory statements criticizing a public official's
conduct was not actionable in the absence of proof of actual
malice. Subjected to this test, the
allegations of the complaint
26
before us are markedly deficient.
That the use of civil libel as a weapon to inhibit the freedom of the
press to report material which reflects on the conduct of public officials is
perhaps more apparent from two cases arising out of civil rights disputes
than it is from the Illinois cases discussed above, all of which arose out of
relatively minor disputes involving local politics and local government.
In Henry v. Collins,2 the county attorney and the chief of police of
Clarksdale, Mississippi, filed an action for libel against an officer of the
Mississippi chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. The alleged defamatory statement was one made to the
press to the effect that his arrest was "the result of a diabolical plot" in which
the plaintiffs were participants, to convict him on trumped-up charges of
sexual misconduct. The verdict was for the plaintiffs, and was upheld by
the Mississippi appellate court and supreme court. The jury instructions
said in part:
If you believe from the evidence that defendant published a false
statement charging that his arrest was the result of a diabolical plot
... you may infer malice ... from the falsity and libelous nature
of the statement, although malice as a legal presumption does not
arise from the fact that the statement in question is false and
libelous. It is for you to determine as a fact ... whether
or not the
28
statement in question was actually made with malice.
In reversing the Mississippi Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court, in a per curiam decision, said simply:
The constitutional guarantees . . . [prohibit] a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
...
with knowledge that it 29
was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
It is perhaps fortunate that cases such as those mentioned above have
caused courts and judges to look again at the traditional attitude that defamation is not protected speech. For too long, in Illinois as elsewhere, newspapers and other critics of public officials have been forced to be extremely
wary of revenge by libel action whenever they might want to embark on a
campaign of criticism of public officials. Perhaps now citizens and newspaper readers will be able to read the news as reporters write it and not as
it is filtered through the cautious fingers of conservative counsel.
MRs. B. SIDLER
26 48 Il1. App. 2d 402, 405, 199 N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ist Dist. 1964).
27 380 U.S. 356, 85 Sup. Ct. 992 (1965).
28 Id. at 357, 85 Sup. Ct. at 993.
29 Ibid.

